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Abstract. The human faculty of moral judgment is not well suited to address problems, like 
climate change, that are global in scope and remote in time. Advocates of ‘moral bioen-
hancement’ have proposed that we should investigate the use of medical technologies to 
make human beings more trusting and altruistic, and hence more willing to cooperate in 
efforts to mitigate the impacts of climate change. We survey recent accounts of the prox-
imate and ultimate causes of human cooperation in order to assess the prospects for bio-
enhancement. We identify a number of issues that are likely to be significant obstacles to 
effective bioenhancement, as well as areas for future research. 
 
1.  Introduction 
Many factors make it difficult for humans to forge the collective commitments 
that are necessary to mitigate the effects of anthropogenic climate change. The 
data that underpin warnings about the dangers are complex and hard for non-
experts to understand [1]. Many of the dangers are remote in time and therefore 
easy to ignore [2]. Human beings are sometimes prone to wishful thinking and 
undue optimism, especially in the face of uncertainty [3]. And we are also inclined 
to prioritise the interests of our immediate kin over the needs of faceless others 
in the future [4].  
Optimal responses to the risks of climate change will almost certainly require 
some parties to make sacrifices now in order to help others later [5,6]. Humans 
typically exhibit some altruistic inclinations, but there are reasons to expect that 
this sort of altruism will be of limited value in responding to problems on the 
scale of climate change. 
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Recent advocates of ‘moral bioenhancement’ have argued that societies should 
make pharmacological and/or genetic interventions to boost people’s altruistic 
dispositions [7-9]. They claim this will greatly improve our chances of effectively 
addressing climate change, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and related global 
challenges [7]. According to two prominent advocates of moral bioenhancement, 
Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, there are four major dispositions involved 
in our moral cognition that could be beneficially influenced via pharmacological 
or genetic therapies in the future, namely: (i) the disposition towards altruism, 
(ii) the disposition towards fairness, (iii) the tendency to adopt a causal concep-
tion of responsibility (which leads us to focus on harms that we cause, at the ex-
pense of neglecting possible benefits that we fail to confer), and (iv) the short-
term bias in our decision-making. The first two dispositions could be enhanced, 
they say, whereas the latter two could be inhibited. While Persson and Savulescu 
concede that proposals along these lines can only be speculative as things cur-
rently stand, they are optimistic that productive interventions to increase altru-
ism and empathy could be brought about in the future. And given the magnitude 
of the problems that such moral bioenhancement could help to address, they rec-
ommend this as a priority area for research investment [7]. 
A number of ethical concerns have been raised against moral bioenhancement. 
Political programs in which governments (or other bodies with coercive powers) 
seek to modify people’s thoughts and feelings to try to fix social problems may be 
intrinsically objectionable [10,11]. And there might be reasons to worry what kind 
of moral personhood would survive in the wake of moral bioenhancement, were 
it to come to fruition [12-14].  
Here we set aside these ethical concerns about moral bioenhancement, and in-
stead review relevant evidence and models to assess the gains that are likely to 
result from intervening on moral dispositions. We argue that enhancing these 
dispositions could in fact hinder the kind of cooperative efforts that are required 
for climate change mitigation. The problem, in essence, is that our moral disposi-
tions operate in a strategic environment that contains both opportunities and 
threats. While there are likely to be opportunities to bring about more fruitful 
cooperation by enhancing some psychological traits, doing so will simultaneously 
leave those treated more susceptible to deception and exploitation. This in turn 
makes it easier for harmful or antisocial behaviour to carry on unimpeded. Am-
plifying other dispositions, such as the disposition to monitor and sanction trans-
gressions from a cooperative scheme, is unlikely to remedy this problem without 
introducing further difficulties. 
Despite the fact that there is a significant and fast-growing scholarly discourse 
on the ethics of moral enhancement, one might think that the kind of proposals 
put forward in this literature are too speculative to be taken seriously as a subject 
of scientific inquiry. We do not currently possess the technological means to 
make any kind of reliable or precise adjustments to moral dispositions like trust 
and empathy, nor do we have institutional mechanisms that would facilitate a 
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widespread implementation of such technologies if they were to be realised any 
time in the near future. But rudimentary moral bioenhancement techniques are 
already available (such as the oxytocin treatments we discuss below; see also 
[15]), and bioenhancement programs of a certain sort are already coercively im-
plemented in some jurisdictions, e.g. where chemical castration is involved in the 
sentencing of people convicted of particular types of criminal acts [16]. 
 
2.  The evolution of cooperation 
Proponents of moral bioenhancement say that we should increase or amplify 
(some of) our prosocial dispositions. From a biological perspective, however, the 
degree of prosociality we see in humans is already surprisingly high. Some kind 
of explanation is needed to account for the prevalence of prosocial and coopera-
tive dispositions in humans, given that such dispositions seem to make individu-
als more vulnerable to being hurt or exploited, and hence at a competitive disad-
vantage to selfish others.  
 
2.1 Altruistic cooperation 
The prisoners’ dilemma is a comprehensively studied paradigm for modelling al-
truistic social interactions. In the most general form of a prisoners’ dilemma, in-
dividual players can offer help at cost c, thereby conferring benefit b > c on the 
other player. Each individual’s payoff is maximized by not helping, but the net 
result of mutual helping (each player receives b – c) is greater than if neither player 
helps (both players receive 0). Consequently, if players pursue their individual 
advantage, they will bring about a socially sub-optimal outcome. These payoffs 
are represented using nominal values (b = 4, c = 1) in Figure 1. (Hereafter we follow 
the custom of referring to the more prosocial behaviour of helping in this, and 
related social dilemma games, as “cooperating”, and refer to not helping as “de-
fecting”.) This is regarded as a model of potentially altruistic behaviour because 
each player can benefit the other, but only at personal cost. The best possible out-
come is to benefit from someone else’s cooperation, while choosing to defect. (We 
discuss mutualistic cooperation – where both parties do best when both cooperate, 
in the following section.) 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix 
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It is well established that in controlled experimental versions of the prisoners’ 
dilemma people are willing to at least initiate cooperation – contrary to apparent 
self-interest – at a nontrivial rate [17]. This occurs despite the prediction that, 
absent other factors, rational players would not cooperate. The choice to defect 
dominates the choice to cooperate; which is to say, irrespective of the other 
player’s choice, each player will fare better by defecting instead of cooperating. 
To explain how organisms can evolve to reliably cooperate in situations of this 
type, there are two broad classes of mechanism that have been postulated. One 
class involves introducing factors that structure the population, making the in-
teractions that occur non-random. If the population is structured in such a way 
that cooperators interact with other cooperators at a greater than chance fre-
quency, it is possible to sustain non-zero levels of cooperation in an evolutionarily 
stable population. Mechanisms such as kin selection (helping genetic relatives) 
[18], direct reciprocity (“I’ll help you if you help me”) [19], and indirect reciprocity 
(“I’ll help you if I see you have helped others”) [20] all work in this fashion. The 
second class of mechanism involves changing the payoffs associated with defec-
tion and cooperation, for instance, by introducing sanctions that are imposed on 
defectors. This is exemplified by models of strong reciprocity (“I’ll punish you if I 
see you have failed to help others”) [21]. 
The following psychological traits are all likely to be involved in implementing 
the broad evolutionary mechanisms identified above. 
Parochialism – the benefits of reciprocity generally require that groups are not 
too large and that we have a reasonable probability of interacting again with 
those we have successfully interacted with in the past. Some degree of in-
group bias is likely to be an important element in maintaining the viability of 
at least some altruistic behaviours, because interactions with outgroup mem-
bers are likely to involve fewer repeat encounters and are likely to be under-
taken with less information about past behaviours [22-24]. 
Reputation monitoring – we pay close attention to the cooperative behaviour of 
others, and make our future cooperative efforts conditional upon what we 
know about the behaviour of others [25-27]. 
Retribution – at least some of us may be disposed to retaliate against those who 
betray our trust or abuse our generosity [28-31]. 
Parochialism and reputation monitoring contribute to structuring the population 
so as to implement mechanisms such as kin selection, direct reciprocity, and in-
direct reciprocity. Retribution contributes to mechanisms that involve changing 
the payoffs of defection, such as strong reciprocity. All three dispositions are in 
some sense negative or defensive: they do not directly lead agents to choose be-
haviours that confer benefits on unrelated others, and may motivate mutually 
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costly behaviour, such as punishment. In the presence of these dispositions, how-
ever, overtly altruistic dispositions such as a tendency to trust others or to empa-
thise with others can be adaptive. 
Empathy/kindness – if we are moved by the plight of others, it will be aversive 
for us to see them suffer, so we are more likely to provide them with assistance 
[32-34]. This is what we mean by empathy or kindness: a disposition to regard 
the conferral of benefits on others as inherently desirable. 
Trust – some prosocial behaviour requires making oneself vulnerable to being 
betrayed, exploited, or let-down by others. In this context, trust is a willing-
ness to make oneself vulnerable in this way, for the sake of a cooperative or 
altruistic goal. This trait is distinct from generalised attitude toward risk 
[35,36]. 
Without denying the reality of these traits, it is a matter of common sense that 
they operate in limited, conditional, and context-sensitive ways. This accords 
with our theoretical understanding of the fragility of altruistic behaviour in evo-
lutionary contexts. All favoured models entail that such altruistic dispositions 
will be selected for only where they operate in conjunction with mechanisms to 
guard against exploitation, such as the parochial, retributive, and judgemental 
dispositions described above. No credible account has been given of how indis-
criminate empathy and trust could, in isolation, be favoured by selection pres-
sures. If a number of organisms began to display indiscriminate empathy and 
trust in strategic environments like this, it would amount to playing a dominated 
strategy: those who lacked the novel traits would prosper, and the mechanisms 
of selection would act to extinguish trust and empathy from the population. 
Three further pieces of evidence suggest that the disposition to trust, in particu-
lar, cannot be unilaterally enhanced without destabilising a prior equilibrium in-
volving defense against potential exploitation.  
(a) Economic experiments employing the trust game, a paradigm designed to test 
participants’ willingness to cooperate together to gain better rewards, have con-
sistently found that the return to trusting behaviour is approximately the same 
as the return to non-trusting behaviour, despite substantial variation in the level 
of trust shown between different cultures [37]. The game involves two players: 
an “investor” and a “trustee”. Investor may transfer any portion of her endowment 
to the trustee’s account. The amount transferred is multiplied by a rate of return 
>1. Trustee can then choose to transfer any amount of the multiplied quantity back 
to the investor, and keeps the remainder. If the trust shown by the investor is 
reciprocated, both parties benefit. Typical investors transfer roughly half of their 
initial endowment, and a non-trivial proportion of trustees return at least that 
much to the investor [37]. Also typically, a number of trustees fail to reciprocate 
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trust by returning zero or other amounts less than the initial investment, but sub-
jects appear to accept a social norm requiring that the profits be shared with the 
investor [38].  
In an experiment conducted in Zurich, investors make accurate discriminations 
of degree of trustworthiness between residents of different urban districts, and 
invest more in regions that yield higher average returns [39]. This evidence does 
not directly support a causal inference as to what would happen if some individ-
uals unilaterally increased their degree of trust, but it is suggestive that subjects 
are adjusting decisions to trust in a way that is sensitive to the strategic environ-
ment. This makes it unlikely that there are large gains to be obtained by interven-
ing to modify degree of trusting behaviour at the population level. 
(b) Recent studies on oxytocin show that there may be some linkage between the pro-
pensity to trust and parochial tendencies to guard against out-group members. 
Oxytocin is a naturally-produced neurotransmitter which affects people’s dispo-
sitions toward generosity [40] and trust [41,42]. In one study using the trust 
game, subjects who had an oxytocin nasal spray administered to them were sig-
nificantly more likely than control group participants to opt for a maximally 
trusting choice, by investing all of their money [41]. Prima facie, such findings 
support the possibility of effective moral bioenhancement, since they show that 
pharmacological interventions can promote trust among strangers. 
However oxytocin has also been found to promote in-group bias and parochial-
ism [43,44]. One study found that in an implicit association test, subjects treated 
with oxytocin were, compared to control group subjects, faster to associate neg-
ative phrases with names linked to an ethnic out-group, and faster to associate 
positive phrases with names linked to an ethnic in-group [44]. Another found 
that subjects treated with oxytocin were more likely to make financial decisions 
that were adverse to out-groups in settings where the in-group was exposed to 
risk of loss [43]. These observations are consistent with the idea that trust is an 
inherently risky disposition, and cannot evolve without accompanying traits that 
protect against exploitation.  
(c) Social attitude surveys find that the distribution of income is non-monotonic and 
hump-shaped with respect to trusting attitudes [45]. The highest income indi-
viduals have median levels of trust relative to the local population, and the most 
trusting individuals earn approximately 14% less than those with median trust 
levels. Furthermore, highly trusting individuals report higher rates of having been 
cheated in the past, lending credence to the hypothesis that their lower income 
is a result of more trusting individuals being exploited [45]. 
Now consider again the social problems associated with climate change – prob-
lems whose solution would require a collective commitment by a large and di-
verse group of parties to sacrifice some of their economic interests in the imme-
diate term (e.g. by dramatically reducing global CO2 production) so as to limit 
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the consequences that future generations will have to cope with. If we could be 
confident that interventions to increase prosocial dispositions like trust and em-
pathy would lead to a social order governed by complete and perfect trust – a 
social order in which individuals always cooperate for the sake of mutual benefit, 
and in which there is no-one who betrays or exploits others for personal gain – 
then we would have some reason to favour such interventions. But interventions 
like these are absurdly utopian. More realistically, we can expect interventions 
that significantly increase the elementary prosocial dispositions of a significant 
number of people. But in view of the strategic implications of trusting others, in-
creased elementary prosocial dispositions will not translate into a reliably in-
creased rate of cooperation. It will instead be an environment that is congenial 
for infiltration by exploitative, uncooperative agents. 
 
2.2 Mutualist cooperation 
Our discussion to this point has assumed that the mode of prosocial behaviour 
that is relevant to social problems connected with climate change is something 
like cooperation in a prisoners’ dilemma. This is not an idiosyncratic assumption; 
many problems linked to climate change are naturally construed as tragedies of 
the commons [46], and the game theoretic form of this dynamic is routinely mod-
elled using the prisoner’s dilemma. Still, this way of framing the problem may be 
too restrictive, and it is possible that other modes of prosocial cooperation are 
important in addressing problems of climate change. Mutualistic cooperation is 
arguably central to the evolution of human cooperation in general [47,48], and it 
provides another framework via which we can model what is required to sustain 
effective cooperation in complex social situations. The stag hunt is the standard 
game theoretic tool for modelling mutualistic cooperation. If both players work 
together to hunt a stag (mutual cooperation), they each receive a high payoff 
(4,4); but hunting stag is risky, and if one player abandons the hunt to catch a 
hare instead (one cooperates, the other defects), then the stag hunter will go hun-
gry while the hare hunter at least gets something (0,3). Both situations in which 
the players adopt an identical strategy – stag and stag (mutual cooperation) or 
hare and hare (mutual defection) – are Nash equilibria, i.e. scenarios in which no 
player stands to gain by unilaterally altering her strategy. Obviously, however, it 
is better – for both players individually, and for the good of the social group that 
they belong to – if players can be induced to cooperate in hunting stag, so as to 
achieve the more rewarding equilibrium. 
Bioenhancement of either a disposition to trust or of a tendency to empathise can 
be predicted to lead to a higher rate of cooperation in a stag hunt (see Figure 2). 
Both factors will increase the relative desirability of cooperating. Enhanced trust 
will lead to a greater tolerance of the risk associated with cooperation. Enhanced 
empathy will increase the aversiveness of making a choice that could lower the 
payoff for the other party. 
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Figure 2. The effect of enhancing trust in a stag hunt 
The game has two equilibria: a risk dominant equilibrium (D,D) and a payoff dominant equilibrium 
(C,C). Trust increases willingness of players to make the high risk choice, thereby moving them to the high-
payoff equilibrium. Enhanced levels of empathy would have a similar effect, by making the CC payoff rel-
atively more attractive than all other payoffs. 
 
Agreeing to major collective reductions in CO2 emissions in order to limit atmos-
pheric warming is a more complex strategic situation than a schematically mod-
elled stag hunt, but it could share a similar underlying structure [49]. If a large 
enough proportion of parties make significant cuts, we will all achieve benefits. 
If only a few parties make significant cuts, then those who cut will still stuffer 
the negative consequences of climate change, but they will also incur the addi-
tional burden of having forgone short-term benefits arising from the exploitation 
of fossil fuel resources. It is strongly desirable to achieve the better equilibrium, 
but this requires a high degree of trust between the parties. 
However, although increasing trust will be beneficial in mutualistic encounters 
of this sort, it remains doubtful that an elevation of our tendency to trust others 
will bring mutual benefits across the whole range of human interactions. The real 
world is rife with strategic uncertainty: the payoffs of our various courses of ac-
tion are difficult to discern, even after the fact; and we can expect other agents to 
react to our new decisions in ways that change those payoffs further. If we 
demonstrate an increased willingness to trust, we should anticipate an increase 
in the frequency of agents who devise schemes to exploit that trust. 
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Figure 3. A Bayesian game against nature 
In which an agent must estimate the probability that she faces a game involving mutualistic cooperation, 
altruistic cooperation, or other possibilities. Provided p is high, trusting behaviour will be adaptive, but if 
agents with high estimates of p become frequent, it is likely that exploitative strategies will evolve and 
thereby increase the frequency of encounters that lead to the exploitation of trust. 
 
A better model of the situation, then, is one where an agent faces a Bayesian game 
against nature (see Figure 3). Nature determines whether we are playing a pris-
oners’ dilemma, a stag hunt, a coordination game, or some other sort of social in-
teraction. An agent has some estimate of the probability distribution over these 
possibilities, and attempts to make an optimal decision in the face of this uncer-
tainty. An agent who is more disposed to trust will be an agent who is more dis-
posed to accept that the game she faces is a cooperative one, more disposed to 
think that her partner will make a cooperative move, or both. For these reasons, 
she will be more likely to cooperate.  
An agent who is trusting in these ways, however, will thereby create an environ-
ment favourable to strategies which exploit the greater degree of trust. Evolution-
ary reasoning predicts that exploitative agents will increase in number, and so 
the frequency with which the agent encounters stag hunts will decrease. The 
trusting agent will be faced more frequently with games where cooperative be-
haviour is maladaptive. In short, it is not possible to unilaterally enhance proso-
cial dispositions without introducing strategic instabilities that decrease the 
overall likelihood of effective cooperative response to complex social problems. 
While there is some reason to be confident in these predictions, given that they 
derive from well understood game theoretic models, they are currently unsup-
ported by experimental observation. An important area for future research will 
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be into the behaviour of “bio-enhanced” individuals in settings that contain op-
portunities for agents to adopt exploitative strategies in a variety of non-trans-
parent games. 
 
3.  Complex interventions for moral bioenhancement 
Thus far we have considered unilateral enhancement of overtly altruistic disposi-
tions such as a tendency to empathise with others or to trust others. A more so-
phisticated strategy of moral bioenhancement may employ simultaneous adjust-
ment of multiple dispositions. Perhaps by increasing our tendency to trust, while 
also enhancing our propensity for fairness (e.g. our retributive and reputation-
monitoring tendencies), it will be possible to realise benefits of cooperation with-
out additional exploitation. 
Simultaneously modifying two or more psychological dispositions will likely 
have novel and unpredictable effects. On existing evidence, however, we have 
substantial reason to doubt that multi-dimensional moral bioenhancement will 
lead to straightforward benefits for solving global challenges like climate change 
(summary in Table 1). 
 
Moral disposition Negative effects of bioenhancement 
Trust Improves payoff for deceptive/exploitative strategies 
Empathy Improves payoff for exploitative strategies 
Retribution Lowers efficiency; may suppress cooperation 
Reputation monitoring Increased rate of false positives may suppress cooperation 
Parochialism Reduces out-group cooperation 
 
Table 1. Summary of psychological dispositions relevant to cooperative behaviour and 
anticipated negative effects of enhancing those dispositions. 
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Consider the three defensive dispositions identified above: parochialism, reputa-
tion monitoring, and retribution.  
Increasing parochial tendencies will no doubt assist in guarding against exploitation, 
but it will also drastically reduce the scope for out-group cooperation. In the con-
text of global challenges that require cooperation between distinct groups, this 
therefore appears to be a hopeless suggestion. 
Increasing retributive tendencies is likely to be of no benefit, or outright harmful. 
Models show that punishment of defectors can promote the evolution of cooper-
ation under a variety of circumstances: if the interactions are structured by a net-
work [50]; if interactions are non-anonymous [51]; if punishment is coordinated 
[52]; and if exit from the population is viable [53]. But many of these models also 
allow the evolution of so-called “anti-social punishment” – punitive behaviour di-
rected towards cooperators [52-54] – casting doubt on the uniformly beneficial 
role of retributive behaviours in stabilising cooperation [55]. Some of these mod-
els also find that the effect of punishment is sensitive to the ratio of cost of pun-
ishment to the benefits of cooperation, but is relatively insensitive to the harsh-
ness of the punishment [51,52]. So increasing the harshness of the punishment to 
the defector is not robustly predicted to improve the levels of cooperation. Ex-
periments also suggest that increasing the severity of punishment, even where it 
increases rates of cooperation, is likely to harm overall efficiency: groups with 
harsh punishment may cooperate more, but they are poorer [31,55]. Further, in-
dividuals who administer punishment tend to gain fewer benefits of cooperation 
than those who refrain [55]. Given that the aim of moral bioenhancement is to 
seek maximally group beneficial solutions, using harsher penalties for transgres-
sion would appear to be self-undermining.  
Reputation monitoring is a more promising avenue for intervention. The success of 
online trading platforms such as eBay has been premised on the establishment of 
trust between relatively anonymous trading partners, enabled by mechanisms for 
the tracking of reputations [56]. But this example reinforces the point that the 
primary obstacles to cooperation are social and institutional, rather than cogni-
tive. Furthermore, we can find no evidence that reputation monitoring could be 
made more effective by pharmacological or genetic interventions. It is conceivable 
that reputation-monitoring could be promoted by some sort of intervention 
which lowers the evidential threshold before judging another agent to have de-
fected. (For instance, there is some evidence that modafinil induces overconfi-
dence in visuomotor abilities in fatigued subjects [57]. Perhaps future drugs could 
be synthesised to induce overconfidence in the domain of judging others to have 
transgressed in a cooperative setting.) But this will increase the rate at which 
false positives occur, and consequently agents will more frequently be punished 
“unfairly” for prosocial behaviour. Experimental evidence suggests that punish-
ment of cooperators is highly destructive of cooperation [58]. Moreover, models 
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of group-structured populations suggest that the destructive effects of punishing 
cooperators increase with the severity of the punishment [59]. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
Insofar as the stimulus for moral bioenhancement issues from concerns about hu-
man societies’ ability to cooperatively tackle problems for which our evolutionary 
inheritance has not ideally equipped us, it needs to come furnished with some 
kind of theory about what makes effective cooperation achievable in the face of 
grave risks and collective action problems. Moral bioenhancement that simply 
purports to make us more trusting, generous, empathetic, etc., overlooks the 
ways in which cooperative success relies on a complex network of social disposi-
tions – some of them involving the imposition of net social costs. And it fails to 
account for the danger that, by tinkering with some of these dispositions, we 
could have an adverse effect on other dispositions, or on the equilibria that obtain 
between different dispositions.  
This conclusion does not entail pessimism. There may well be radical innovations 
that could help human societies engage in cooperative problem-solving more ef-
fectively than at present. But if we are to enhance human cooperation we should 
start with a good theory about what makes our existing cooperative endeavours 
possible in the first place. 
 
Acknowledgements: Thanks to Chet Pager and Janine Perlman for helpful feedback 
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